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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you work for a multi-national corporation that invests
heavily in research and development and manufactures a large
portfolio of products. Each year, company scientists and engineers
develop new technologies that are patented or kept as trade secrets,
trademarked and commercialized. However, some of the corpora-
tion's technology cannot be effectively commercialized to recoup
the expenses of its investment. As a result, the corporation licenses
these technologies to other companies, usually involving patent li-
censes and trademark licenses.
Now imagine you have just learned of an explosion at a manu-
facturing plant in Southfield, Michigan, which has killed twenty-five
people. The manufacturing company to whom you licensed your
technology owns the plant where the accident occurred. Upon fur-
ther investigation, you learn that the building where the explosion
occurred was the same building where the manufacturing company
was using your patented chemical process to manufacture a prod-
uct originally designed by you, covered by your patent, and sold
under your current.trademark. Many questions race through your
mind. Is your company a potential defendant in a products liability
lawsuit because it was the designer and developer of the original
technology? Is your company a potential defendant based on its
status as a patent licensor? What is your liability risk as the owner
of the current trademark? Did you effectively distance your com-
pany from the manufacturing company in your licensing agree-
ment? Will potential plaintiffs seek to include you in the lawsuit
because of your "deep pockets?"
This paper summarizes the potential liability of trademark li-
censors,1 original designers and developers of technology who are
1. Infra Part IV.
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not the manufacturer,2 and patent licensors with respect to current
case law,s and policies for both supporting and opposing liability.
A variety of ways are also included to help minimize such liability
from extending to trademark licensors, designers who are not the
manufacturer, and patent licensors.
II. THE EXPANSION OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The explosion of products liability lawsuits in recent years is
enough to make any developer of technology very nervous. One
reason for the growth in products liability litigation has been the
courts' willingness to break down barriers to extend liability to de-
fendants. One barrier was the "privity requirement." Originally,
"anyone not in 'privity of contract' with the supplier could not re-
cover for the supplier's negligence no matter how directly and fore-
seeable his injuries were causally linked to that negligence. ,4 In
1916, Judge Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. eliminated
the privity requirement as an obstacle to recover against negligent
manufacturers to encourage manufacturers to make products
safer.5 Judge Cardozo stated:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain
to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is
then a thing of danger .... If to the element of danger
there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by
persons other than the purchaser, and used without new
tests, then irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of
this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.
6
A second barrier to establishing the defendant's negligence
was eliminated by the development of strict liability. The famous
case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. made it easier for
plaintiffs to seek relief v In Greenman, Justice Traynor established
the doctrine of strict liability, stating:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
2. Infra Part V.
3. Infra Part VI.
4. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TwERKI, PRODUCrS LIABILITY PROB-
LEMS AND PROCESS 8 (3rd ed. 1997).
5. Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916).
6. Id.
7. 377 P.2d 897, 900-01 (Cal. 1962).
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injury to a human being .... The purpose of such liability
is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defec-
tive products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than the injured per-
sons who are powerless to protect themselves and since
the manufacturers have the most knowledge of the prod-
uct, they can most effectively reduce the hazards."
Justice Traynor was instrumental in the adoption of Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts by the American Law Insti-
tute in 1964, which allowed a user or consumer, without having to
establish negligence, to bring an action against a manufacturer, as
well as against any other member of a distribution chain that sold a
product containing a manufacturing defect.9 The adoption of this
section opened many doors to plaintiffs which had otherwise been
closed.
A second reason for the growth in products liability litigation
has been the courts' expansion of the scope of potential plaintiffs;
for example, buyers of used products'0 and innocent bystanders. 1
The courts have also expanded the scope of potential defendants,
for example, component part manufacturers.
A third reason for the growth in products litigation has been
8. Id.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS§ 402A (1964):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The
rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised
all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the
user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
10. See generally Crandell v. Larkin and Jones Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31
(S.D. 1983) (purchaser of reconditioned clothes dryer sued the used-product
merchant from whom she purchased the dryer. The used-product merchant was
found strictly liable for the defective dryer.).
11. See generally Salvia v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 489 N.E.2d 394 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986) (plaintiff shot in the eye by the plaintiffs brother while cleaning his BB
gun).
12. See generally Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1965) (manu-
facturer of a defective truck brake found liable); Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc.,
981 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1992) (where a component is defectively designed for its
designated use involving replacement liner for swimming pool which lacked depth
markers).
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the courts' willingness to impose strict liability on non-
manufacturers located further up the distributive chain from the
manufacturer. To impose liability on these non-manufacturers, the
courts have used the "stream-of-commerce" approach. One of the
first cases to use the stream of commerce theory was Kasel v. Rem-
ington Arms.i3 The Kasel court stated:
[N]o precise legal relationship to the member of the
enterprise causing the defect to be manufactured or to
the member most closely connected with the customer is
required before the court will impose strict liability. It is
the defendant's participatory connection, for his personal
profit or benefit... which calls for imposition of strict li-
ability.
14
Using this same theory, other courts have determined that
status as a lessor or franchisor in the distribution chain does not
protect a party from being a defendant in a products liability law-
suit. For example, the court in Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing &
Rental Service found a long-term lessor of trucks strictly liable for an
injurious defect that arose during the term of the lease. 15 Other
courts have stated both lessors and sellers are an integral part of
the overall marketing enterprise and, therefore, they should bear
the cost of injuries resulting from defective products.
As a result, products liability may extend to various parties in
the distribution chain. The parties discussed in this paper are all
considered "upstream" from the party who manufactured the
product that caused the harm and even further "upstream" from
the person who suffered injury.
III. PRODUCTS LIABILITY THEORIES
Various types of liability should be understood before discuss-
ing whether or not liability extends to trademark licensors, design-
ers who are not the manufacturers, and patent licensors.
A. Negligence
The following must exist for a negligence cause of action: 1) a
13. 24 Cal. App. 3d 711.
14. Id. at 323.
15. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769, 783 (NJ.
Sup. Ct. 1965).
16. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 466 P.2d 722, 726 (Cal. 1970).
2000]
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duty of reasonable care on the part of the defendant; 2) a breach of
that duty; 3) a causal connection between the conduct and the in-
jury; and 4) an actual loss or damage as a result of injury. 7 Negli-
gence typically occurs when a manufacturer does not use reason-
able care when designing or manufacturing a product. "Negligent
manufacture" refers to conduct with respect to a single, sk ecific
product. "Negligent design" refers to an entire product line. Rea-
sonableness is judged in view of whether someone would do the
same thing or not in the same or similar circumstances.
B. Strict Liability
Strict product liability is "liability in tort for harm caused by
defective products without any necessity for the plaintiff to show
fault on the part of the defendant."' 9 Strict liability looks to the
product rather than the conduct of the seller. "It is not important
whether the defendant's negligence played a role in causing a
product to be defective. A manufacturer may have utilized the fin-
est methods of quality control extant but would still be held liable if
the product that emerged from the assembly line were defective."2 °
The purpose of strict liability "is to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturer
that put such products on the market rather than by the injured-- • ,,21
persons who are powerless to protect themselves. Other reasons
generally given for the imposition of strict liability are to "prevent
accidents and prevent frustration of consumer expectations, 22 en-
couraging investment in product safety, discouraging consumption
of hazardous products, reducing transaction costs, and promotingS 23
loss spreading.
17. Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 202 (Nov.
1998).
18. Id.
19. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUcrs LIABILITY PROB-
LEMS AND PROCEss73 (3 d ed. 1997).
20. Id. at 16.
21. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1962).
22. P. Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, UNIV.
ILL. L.F. 693, 697 n. 14 (1964).
23. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSEi, PRODUCTS LIABILITY PROB-
LEMS AND PROCESS 84 (3V ed. 1997).
[Vol. 27:1
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C. Breach of Warranty
Causes of action in breach of warranty consist of three separate
theories: 1) implied warranty of merchantability; 2) implied war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose; and 3) express warranty.
All three are derived from the Sales Article (Article 2) of the Uni-
24form Commercial Code. Regardless of what type of warranty is
claimed to be breached, a plaintiff must prove the following: 1) the
defendant made an express warranty, or circumstances that sup-
port the imposition of any implied warranty; 2) the product
breached the warranty at the time of sale; 3) the existence of dam-
age as a result of the breach; and 4) the breach was the legal and
factual cause of the damages.25 Merchantability is clearly the most
important implied warranty because it is inseparable from the sale
of product. The buyer need do nothing other than purchase the
product. Breach of warranty plays an important role in determin-
ing the liability of trademark licensors discussed below.
IV. LIABILITY EXTENDING TO TRADEMARK LICENSORS
Of the three types of parties discussed in this article, the law
regarding trademark licensor liability has been the most litigated
and thus, the law is more developed in this area, as compared to
designers and patent licensors.
A. Trademark Licenses
A trademark is any "word, name, symbol, or device" used by a
manufacturer or merchant "to identify and distinguish his or her
goods ... from those manufactured or sold by others... 26 In gen-
eral, trademarks perform four functions: 1) to identify one's seller's
goods and distinguish them from goods sold by others; 2) to signify
that all goods bearing the trademark come from or are controlled
by a single, albeit anonymous source; 3) to signify that all goods
bearing the trademark are of an equal level of quality; and 4) as a
27prime instrument in advertising and selling the goods. In addi-tion, a trademark is the objective symbol of the "good will" that
24. See generally U.C.C. ART. II.
25. Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2.03 (Nov.
1998).
26. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1998).
27. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 3:2 (41h ed. 1998).
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business has built up. Without the identification function per-
formed by trademarks, buyers would have no way of returning to
buy the product that they have used and liked. Hence, this con-
sumer satisfaction and preference is typically labeled "good will"
and a trademark is the symbol by which the world can identify that
good will.
2 s
Trademarks may be licensed to others, but only where the li-
censor exercises control over goods and services that reach the cus-
tomer under the licensed mark. Control is necessary to ensure the
29expected level of quality is maintained. Since the quality control
function of trademarks is so important, a trademark licensor must
have the right to inspect and certify the quality of products or ser-
vices sold with the licensed mark under the federal Lanham
Trademark Act. 3' Also, under the Lanham Act, if the licensor fails
to maintain sufficient actual control, the trademark may be consid-
ered abandoned.3 ' This quality control requirement over the na-
ture and quality of the product on which the trademark is used
forms the basis for finding trademark licensors liable for injuries to
third parties who use a product bearing the trademark licensor's
trademark.
B. Review Of Case Law
Under the current case law, trademark licensors are subject to
strict liability only when their licensee's products or services hurt a
third party and when the licensor participates substantially in the
design, manufacture or distribution of the licensee's products or
services. However, in examining the legal history of liability of
trademark licensors, the law has not always been so clear. Plaintiffs
have exercised many different theories to find trademark licensors
liable.
The basis for holding trademark licensors strictly liable for
their licensee's actions was founded initially on two theories in the
early 1970's. The first theory was based on agency principles of ap-
parent authority. The trademark represented the giving of ap-
28. Id.
29. Principe v. McDonalds' Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 311 (4" Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981).
30. 15 U.S.C.A § 1127 (West 1998).
31. 15 U.S.C.A § 1051-1127 (West 1998).
32. Gizzi et al. v. Texaco Inc., 437 F.2d 308, 310 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 829 (1971); Carter v.J. Bancroft & Sons, 360 F. Supp. 1103, 1106-07 (E.D.
[Vol. 27:1
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parent authority to a licensee to act on behalf of the licensor. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts stated, "[o] ne who puts out as his own
product a chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same
liability as though he were its manufacturer. '"" Comment (d) in
the same section illustrated the applicability of the rule to the
owner of a trademark:
[O]ne puts out a chattel as his own product when he puts
it out under his name or affixes to it his trade name or
trademark. When such identification is referred to on the
label as an indication of the quality or wholesomeness of
the chattel, there is an added emphasis that the user can• . 34
rely upon the reputation of the person so identified.
Therefore, a customer assumes when buying a product bearing
a trademark that the product comes from the trademark owner,
who is responsible for the product, even if it is made by the trade-
mark licensee, who must be acting on behalf of the trademark li-
censor.
The second theory used by plaintiffs was the "stream of com-
merce" theory. The stream of commerce theory advocates that
strict liability should attach to anyone, including the trademark
owner, within the "stream of commerce" in which the product
flows. For example, the Second District Court of Appeals in Cali-
fornia used this expansive theory to find Remington Arms Com-
pany strictly liable for the personal injuries caused by a defective
shell manufactured by its Mexican trademark licensee. Acknowl-
edging that this was the first case to apply strict liability in tort up-
ward in the chain of distribution to a trademark licensor, the court
said it was justified in imposing liability on anyone who is a link in
the marketing enterprise, which places a defective product within
the stream of commerce.3 6 The court stated that:
It is the defendant's participatory connection, for his per-
sonal profit or other benefit, with the injury-producing
product and with the enterprise that created consumer
demand for and the reliance upon the product (and not
the defendant's legal relationship (such as agency) with
the manufacturer or other entities involved in the manu-
Pa. 1973).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFToRTs § 400 (1964).
34. Id. at cmt. d.
35. Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 725 (Cal. Ct. App.
1972).
36. Id.
2000]
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facturing-marketing system) which calls for imposition of
strict liability.37
As the law further developed in the late 1970's, courts started
using a breach of warranty theory to find trademark licensors li-
able, particularly using a breach of an implied warranty of mer-
chantability. Relying primarily on the quality control requirement
for trademark licensors, one of the first successful breach of war-
ranty actions was brought against the 7-Up Corporation by a plain-
tiff injured when a bottle slipped from a carton and exploded.
Pursuant to the trademark agreement, the licensor retained the
right to approve the type and design of carton used by the licen-
see. The court found that although the licensor did not manufac-
ture, sell, handle, ship or require the use of the product, it had ex-
ercised control over the "type, style, size and design of the allegedly
defective carton to the extent that it could be considered a supplier
of the product. '40 The court relied on the following factors in find-
ing the licensor strictly liable: 1) the risk created by approving an
unsafe product for distribution; 2) the licensor's ability and oppor-
tunity to eliminate the unsafe character of the product; 3) the con-
sumer's lack of knowledge of the danger; and 4) the consumer's re-
liance on the trademark which nave the impression that the
licensor stood behind the product. Other courts have used simi-
lar factors finding trademark licensors liable under a breach of war-
42ranty.
By the 1980's, the courts had narrowed the question of liability
to one of sufficient participation. In other words, had the trade-
mark licensor participated significantly enough in the design,
manufacture or distribution of the licensee's products to justify the
imposition of strict liability under Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts? Sufficient participation was determined on the
particular facts of the case. Thus, it is worth examining which facts
show evidence of sufficient participation and which did not.
One example where a court found a trademark licensor suffi-
ciently participated in the licensee's products is Torres v. Goodyear
37. Id.
38. Kosters v. The Seven-Up Co., 595 F.2d 347, 352 (6 h Cir. 1979).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. E.g., Harris v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 550 F. Supp. 1024, 1028 (W. Va
1982).
[Vol. 27:1
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Tire & Rubber Co. 43 The Torres court found the trademark licensor
liable based on the licensor's level of involvement in the produc-
tion of the tires, which caused the plaintiffs injuries.4 The licens-
ing agreement required the tires to be manufactured according to
the licensor's formulas and specifications, using only materials ap-
proved by the licensor, and gave the licensor the right to approve
labeling, marketing, packaging, and advertising.4  Secondly, the
court believed due to on the overlap in management between the
licensee and licensor and the percentage of stock the licensor held
in the licensee corporation, the licensor maintained sufficient con-
trol over the licensee to subject it to liability.46
A second example where a court found that a trademark licen-
sor participated sufficiently is City of Hartford v. Associated Construc-
tion Co.47 The City of Hartford court found a trademark licensor li-
able for a defective roofing base product sold by its licensee. 48 The
licensor formulated, designed, advertised, manufactured, distrib-
uted, sold, nationally promoted, and issued specifications and in-
structions for the product. 49 The licensee could only buy the raw
materials for making the product from the licensor.0 Consistent
with the requirements of the Lanham Act, the licensor retained
and exercised rights of control as to the quality of the product as
well as to the methods and manner of its application under its li-
censing agreement.5' These actions exhibited sufficient control by
52
the licensor over the licensee to find the licensor strictly liable.
In contrast, courts have not found evidence of substantial par-
ticipation by the licensor where the licensor's involvement was lim-
ited to merely displaying their trademark on the product or mar-
keting assistance to promote the product."
The recently published Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Li-
ability draws liability distinctions between those trademark licensors
43. 786 P.2d 939, 945 (Ariz. 1990).
44. Id. at 947-48.
45. Id. at 942.
46. Id. at 947-48.
47. 384 A.2d 390, 392 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. E.g., Hebel v. Sherman Equip., 442 N.E 2d 199, 204 (Ill. 1982); see also
Jackson v. Cold Spring Terrace Property Owners Assoc., 939 S.W.2d 762, 769 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1997).
20001
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who substantially participate in their licensee's products and those
trademark licensors who do not.
C. Review Of Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability
Trademark licensors are included in Section 14 of the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, "Selling or Distributing as
One's Own a Product Manufactured by Another." This section was
derived from Section 400 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. "One
engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing prod-
ucts who sells or distributes as its own a product manufactured by
another is subject to the same liability as though the seller or dis-
tributor were the product's manufacturer., 54  The owner of a
trademark is not liable if he licenses a manufacturer to place the
licensor's trademark or logo on the manufacturer's product and
distribute it as though manufactured by the licensor 5  Even
though purchasers of the product might assume that the trademark
owner was the manufacturer, the licensor does not "sell[s] or dis-
tribute [s] as its own a product manufactured by another. '56 How-
ever, trademark licensors are liable for harm caused by defective
products distributed under the licensor's trademark or logo when
they substantially participate in the design, manufacture, or distri-
51
bution of the licensee's products. In these circumstances, they are
treated as sellers of the products bearing their trademarks and may
be liable for the manufacturing defect, defective design, or failure
to warn of defects in the licensee's products.8
In summary, trademark licensor liability is determined by
whether or not the trademark licensor has substantially partici-
pated in the design, manufacture or distribution of the licensee's
products. Ways for minimizing liability, while still maintaining the
quality requirements under the Lanham Act, are listed in a later
section.
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 14 (1998).
55. Id. at cmt. c.
56. Id. at § 14.
57. Id.
58. Id.
[Vol. 27:1
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V. LIABILITY EXTENDING To ORIGINAL DESIGNERS AND
DEVELOPERS OF TECHNOLOGY WHO ARE NOT THE MANUFACTURERS
OF THE PRODUCT
In contrast to the thirty years of precedent for trademark li-
censors, the law concerning original designers and developers of
technology who are not the manufacturers of the product is not as
well developed.
A. Designers/Developers Of Technology And Independent Designers
There are two broad categories of designers and developers.
The first category are those designers and developers who design a
new product and the process of making the product, initially
manufacture the products themselves, but later decide to transfer
or license the designs and knowledge for making the product to
another manufacturer. The multi-national corporation fits into
this category. The second category of designers and developers are
commonly labeled "independent designers." The independent de-
signer is usually an outside contractor hired by the manufacturer.
Independent designers may receive general direction from the
manufacturer, but they then apply their professional design talents
to transform the manufacturer's needs into a specific design. For
example, chemical-processing companies may obtain the services of
independent designers to develop portions of a chemical manufac-
turing process or plant. Both categories of designers are consid-
ered "upstream" from a manufacturer in the chain of distribution
and both provide special information to the manufacturer for de-
signing and manufacturing the final product.
The original designers and developers of technology, who are
not the actual manufacturers of the product, and independent de-
signers may become defendants in a products liability lawsuit where
the product or process produced by the manufacturer harms a
third party. The injured third party may claim that the product was
defective in the original design provided by the designers and thus,
as the original designers, they should be held liable.
B. Review Of Case Law
Only a few cases have addressed the question of whether the
person who developed the original design for the product could be
2000]
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found liable. One of the first cases was Alm v. Aluminum Co. ofS 59
America. In Alm, the plaintiff suffered a severe eye injury when an
aluminum bottle cap exploded off a soft drink bottle. The defen-
dant, Aluminum Co. of America ("Alcoa"), was the original de-
signer of the aluminum caps and the designer and manufacturer of
the carping machines, which applied the aluminum caps to the
bottle. However, Alcoa did not manufacture or sell the caps for
the bottles.62 The plaintiff sued Alcoa for both negligence and
strict liability in design of the bottle and cap assemblage, and for63
failing to warn. The district court dismissed the strict liability
claim, but rendered a general verdict for the plaintiff on the other
claims, and Alcoa appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Texas affirmed and stated:
A manufacturer has long been held to have a duty to ex-
ercise ordinary care in the design of a product.... A de-
signer who is not also the manufacturer should share the
same duty to develop a safe design .... There is no reason
to distinguish a designer, who has intimate knowledge of a
designed product, from a retailer, wholesaler or manufac-
turer. Alcoa designed the closure system. It is the failure
of that system which caused Alm's injury. There can be no
justification for requiring a user of Alcoa's closure tech-
nology to warn of its hazards while not holding Alcoa to
the same duty.65
A second case involved an original designer who was sued even
though he was unaware others were using his design. In Piscitello v.
Hobart Corp., the plaintiff was injured when she caught her hand in
a meat grinder.66 Hobart Corporation originally designed the meat
grinder in 1931, but did not manufacture or sell the actual grinder
67
that caused the plaintiffs injury. Instead, a separate company,
Intedge, manufactured the grinder that caused the injury. Int-
69
edge patterned its grinder design after Hobart's original design.
59. 717 S.W.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. Tex. 1986).
60. Id. at 591.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 717 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Sup. Ct. Tex. 1986).
66. 799 F. Supp 224, 226 (Mass. 1992).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
[Vol. 27:1
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 28
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss1/28
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND LICENSORS
The plaintiff argued that strict liability should attach to any ?arty
that is involved in the original design of the defective product. 0 In
making this argument, the plaintiff relied on the policy that "the
burden of recompensing the injured should be spread to those
parties responsible for the defect and in the best position to elimi-
nate dangers in the future."71 Since Hobart developed the original
design, they were in the best position to eliminate future dangers.
Instead, the court found for the original designer, Hobart, reason-
ing, "[i] t would be unfair to impose such an expansive view of tort
liability on those whose original design is mimicked without the de-
7,2signer's permission." Naturally, this finding of the court begs the
question that if Hobart granted permission to Intedge to copy the
design, would the court's decision been different? Based on the
discussion below, if the original designer, Hobart, had granted
permission, and the meat grinder was negligently designed, then
most likely Hobart would have been liable in negligence.
Other cases have addressed the question of liability of the
original designer in the "independent designer" context. The facts
in these cases are largely the same. Companies hire independent
designers to design a product or process and a third party is hurt as
a result of the design. In general, the weight of the authority is that
independent designers may be held liable for negligence in their
designs, but not liable under a theory of strict liability.
As one example, in Mechanical Rubber & Supply Co. v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., the defendant designed and assembled a hopper, which
caused the plaintiffs injury.73 The court stated:
Where a party merely designs a product for someone else
there is no sale or equivalent transaction between the par-
ties which subject the designer to liability as part of the
distributive system. Such party provides a service and
subjects the party to the duty to exercise reasonable care,
but the party is not liable on a products liability theory.4
In another example, La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., the defen-
dant was contracted to design, engineer and supervise the con-
struction and startup of a new chemical process for a manufac-
turer.715  The process used pellets containing vanadium, which
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 799 F. Supp. 224, 226 (Mass. 1992).
73. 399 N.E.2d 722, 723 (Il. App. Ct. 1980).
74. Id.
75. 402 F.2d 937, 942-43 (3" Cir. 1968).
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caused one of the manufacturer's employees, the plaintiff, to de-
velop cancer in his throat.76 The jury found for the defendant, and
the plaintiff appealed." The appellate court stated that providing
professional services lacks the elements of strict liability, but that
negligence was applicable. Since the jury found no negligence on
the part of the defendant, thejudgment was affirmed 9
In summary, whether an original designer is independent or
not, if he or she negligently develops a design, which is later em-
bodied in a final product by a separate manufacturer, and a third
party's injuries are caused by their negligent design, then the origi-
nal designer may be held liable. However, the theory of strict liabil-
ity is not applicable as a general matter to original designers and
developers.
The recent Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability is con-
sistent with this analysis, at least in regard to independent design-
ers, and provides some guidance to original designers in determin-
ing the reasonableness of their design.
C. Review Of Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability
The Third Restatement does not discuss the potential liability of
original designers and developers of technology who are not the
manufacturers. However, the Third Restatement does address service
providers, which includes independent designers.
Under Section 19, "Definition of Product," there is a distinc-
tion drawn between services and products."' "The courts are
unanimous in refusing to categorize commercially-provided ser-
vices as product for the purposes of strict products liability in
tort."8 2 The Third Restatement states "[a] wide range of other service-
providers are insulated from strict products liability in tort," citing
Snyder v. ISC Alloys, Ltd., where an architect was not strictly liable for
an alleged defect in a package of designs, technical drawings, and
813professional advice. This view is consistent with the independentdesigner cases discussed above. In short, designers are not subject
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFToRTS: PRODUCTS LIABILIY (1998).
81. Id. at§ 19.
82. Id.
83. 772 F. Supp. 244, 250 (W.D. Pa. 1991).
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to strict liability.
With regard to negligence of design, designers may look to
Section 2, "Categories of Product Defects," which states:
A product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks
of harm posed by the product could have been reduced
or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative de-
sign by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in
the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of
the alternative design renders the product not reasonably
safe.
84
Designers have the duty to exercise ordinary care when provid-
ing information to the manufacturer that is used in the final design
of a product. To assess whether they are meeting their duty of
care, the Third Restatement provides several factors for judging the
reasonableness of an alternative design. These factors include:
magnitude and probability of the foreseeable risks of harm, the in-
structions and warnings accompanying the product, the nature and
strength of consumers' expectations regarding the product, the
relative advantages and disadvantages of the product as designed
and as it alternatively could have been designed, production costs,
product longevity, maintenance, repair, and aesthetics. 5 As a re-
sult, before transferring their product designs and processes for
making the product, the designers may want to review these factors
to help assess their liability risk.
VI. LIABILITY EXTENDING To PATENT LICENSORS
Typically, after designing a new product, a designer may seek
patent protection to protect his or her invention and then license
his or her design to others. As a consequence, the original de-
signer may also be sued based on his or her status as a patent licen-
sor. Unfortunately, this area of the law is not as well developed as
trademark licensors liability. But, much has been written about the
topic.
A. Patent Licenses
A patent issued by the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office grants
an exclusive right to the patentee to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (b) (1998).
85. Id. at § 2(b) cmt. f.
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United States or importing that invention into the United States.86
A patent license is essentially a contractual promise by the patent
owner to refrain from asserting these rights against the licensee
should the licensee practice the invention. Typically, a licensee will
make and sell a product or use a process that is covered by the
scope of the patent and pay royalties to the licensor.
Patent licensors may be included in products liability lawsuits
for a variety of reasons when the patent licensee's product or proc-
ess harms a third party. For example, the patent licensee may be
unavailable, judgment-proof, insolvent, beyond the court's jurisdic-
tion or protected by workers compensation plans. Alternatively,
the injured third party might seek recovery from the licensor for
tactical or jurisdictional reasons, or simply because the licensor has
"deeper pockets." The injured party usually alleges the injuries suf-
fered were due to a defect that is traceable back to the licensor,
where the licensor had some responsibility.
B. Predictions Of Liability Extending To Patent Licensor
In the past twenty years, many commentators have predicted
that products liability will eventually extend to patent licensors.
The most common rationale for this prediction is that patent licen-
sors are in positions analogous to trademark licensors. In particu-
lar, it is argued that if the patent licensor retains some type of con-
trol over the activities of the licensee, this could be analogous to
the control found in a trademark license, which brings liability to
the trademark licensor. 7 It is also argued that members of the pub-
lic could reasonably conclude that the lpatent licensee is acting on
the authority of the patent licensor. However, based on the
differences in policies between patents and trademarks discussed
below, this analogy does not fit.
Secondly, commentators believe patent licensors fall within the
definition of strict liability provided by Section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts.89 Several argue that licensed patent rights
should be considered a "product" and the licensor should be con-
sidered a "seller," under Section 402A. Since patents "have the at-
86. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1999).
87. Arthur Schwartz, Patents Contingency Fees and United States Products Liability
Law, PAT. WORLD, March 1988, at 26, 29.
88. Dale H. Cowan, Tort Liability of Patentee Licensors, 64J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK]
OFF. Soc'Y87, 92-93 (1982).
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS§ 402A (1964).
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tributes of personal property, ' and are "capable of being 'pro-
duced' through the creating of an inventive idea and the successful
prosecution of the patent application," then they should be consid-
ered products under Section 402A.9' The commentators reason
"[i]f the inventor's 'product' contains an inherent latent defect, it is
likely.., that the inventor's product along with the defect will be
incorporated into the subsequent blueprints and translated into
the final physical product without substantial change, satisfying that
requirement of § 402A.,92 However, based on the new definitions
of "product" and "one who sells or otherwise distributes" provided
by the recent Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, all of this
controversy should be put to rest.
Thirdly, some commentators believe liability should extend to
patent licensors due to a breach of the implied warranties of mer-
chantability and fitness. 93 Still others argue that patent licensors
may be liable under a negligence theory under Section 395 of Re-
statement (Second) of Torts.
94
Lastly, commentators often point to Prosser and Keeton on
Torts where patent licensors are mentioned as possible defendants
to a products liability lawsuit:
It can be said that all those who participate in the process
of making products available to users for profit or finan-
cial gain are subject to liability on a negligence theory.
This would include endorsers, licensors of trademarks and
franchisers, and perhaps also those who license another to
manufacture and sell a patented invention.95
But to the contrary, based on the analysis of case law to date,
there has not been an explosion of cases extending liability to the
patent licensor. In fact, there has been very little case law on the
subject, none of which found the patent licensor liable.
90. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
91. Dennis R. Kimball, Strict Tort Liability of Inventors for Defective and Dangerous
Inventions: The Issue May Be On the Horizon, 10 CAP. U. L. REv. 803, 815-17 (1981).
92. Id. at 821.
93. Dale H. Cowan, Tort Liability of Patentee Licensors, 64J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK]
OFF. Soc'y 87, 95-99 (1982); W.T. Vukowich, Implied Warranties in Patent, Know-How
and Technical Assistance Licensing Agreements 50 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'Y
307 (1968).
94. Cowan, supra note 88 at 101.
95. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 101
(5h ed. 1984).
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C. Review Of Case Law
Although much commentary has been written about potential
patent licensor liability, in reality, very few cases have ever been
brought to trial. In fact, this author could not find a single case
where the patent licensor was found liable based on their status as a
patent licensor alone. The case most directly on point is Firestone
Steel Products Co. v. Barajas.96
In the late 1950's, Firestone designed and patented a new sin-
gle-piece wheel known as the 15-degree bead seat taper.97 This de-
sign permitted the installation of a tubeless tire on a wheel, instead
of the tube-type tires then used on trucks. 98 Firestone granted a
royalty-free license of its design to the entire industry.9 9 By allowing
domestic manufacturers of tires and wheels to use the design with-
out charging a license fee under its patent, Firestone hoped to
build industry use of the products that would help build customer
demand for Firestone's own products.90  Kelsey-Hayes Company
modified Firestone's original wheel design to design its own
wheel. 10' Jimmy Barajas used a tire manufactured by Kelsey-Hayes
when attempting to fix a flat tire on a ton pickup. °2 Barajas tried
to inflate a 16-inch tire made by General Tire Company on a 16.5-
in. diameter wheel made by Kelsey-Hayes Company. The tire ex-
ploded, fatally injuring Barajas. 04 The administrator of Barajas' es-
tate brought a wrongful death suit against Firestone Co., Kelsey-
Hayes Co., and others for allegations of negligence, strict products
liability, and civil conspiracy.' ° Firestone did not participate in the
manufacture or marketing of Kelsey-Hayes' tires in any way, and did
not collect a royalty from Kelsey-Hayes for use of Firestone's pat-
ented design. 
6
The district court granted Firestone's motion for summary
judgment.0 7 The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the
96. 927 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. 1996).
97. Id. at 611.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 611-12.
106. Id. at 612.
107. Id.
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case. 08 On application for writ of error, the majority of the Su-
preme Court of Texas held that Firestone was not liable under neg-
ligence, not strictly liable, had no duty to warn the users of the li-
censee's products and thus, could not be held liable under a theory
of civil conspiracy.'0 9 The court stated, "in the circumstances of this
case, the original designer of a general product concept that is cop-
ied, modified and used by a manufacturer is not liable for injuries
resulting from the use of the manufacturer's product. '1 10
The court relied on three lines of reasoning to eliminate the
Barajas' strict liability claim."' First, the court analogized Fire-
stone's position as a licensor to that of original designers of a sys-
tem or prototype that gives the design to another party." "This ac-
tion alone is not enough to impose liability under a strict products
liability theory. ' 1 "Mere preparation of a drawing or a prototype,
does not constitute designing the eventual product from which li-
ability does lie."'"14 Second, the court relied primarily on law relat-
ing to trademark licensor liability in stating, "[m]ost jurisdictions
require more than the mere act of licensing a design to impose
strict products liability, and require some purposeful activity with
respect to the design by the licensor as well. Third, the court
stated that under traditional products liability law, the plaintiff
must prove the defendant supplied the product that caused the in-
jury and "[i]t is not enough that the seller merely introduced
products of similar design and manufacture into the stream of,116 ,. -
commerce." With regard to Firestone's duty to warn, the court
stated that a manufacturer generally does not have a duty to warn
or instruct about another manufacturer's products. Because Fire-
stone did not design, manufacture or sell the wheel, the court con-
cluded Firestone owned no duty to Barajas, which negated an es-
sential element of the Barajas' negligence cause of action."7
Justice Enoch dissented in the majority's treatment of the neg-
ligence claims. Relying on Alm v. Aluminum Co. of America, dis-
108. Id.
109. Id. at 615-17.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at613.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 614
116. Id.
117. Id. at616.
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cussed above in the section on designer liability, Justice Enoch
stated:
It makes little sense to hold liable a manufacturer who
purchased or obtained by license someone else's design,
but not the party ultimately responsible for the design. A
negligent design claim should not fail simply because the
design is divorced from the manufacture of the product.
Moreover, while a manufacturer may have independent
liability for failing to test a product design, it would have a
right of indemnity against a designer who licensed or sold
a negligent design to the manufacturer.
Other than Firestone, the author found no other case directly
on point, with the exception of two cases, which included only dic-
tum regarding patent licensor liability. The first case was Torres v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., a trademark licensor case discussed
above. The Torres court distinguished patent licensors from trade-
mark licensors:
The licensor of a patent is often in a somewhat different
position. The licensor's contract is generally nothing
more than a contract authorizing the use of an alleged
patent, i.e., an invention. The product sold by the licen-
see is generally not sold under the trade name of the li-
censor of the patent. The general public is not in most
instances relying on the licensor. That is not to say the li-
censor may not participate to such an extent in the con-
struction and sale of products made pursuant to a patent
tojustify the imposition of strict liability." 9
The second case was an independent designer case, Mechanical
Rubber & Supply Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., which included patent
licensors in a group of parties not subject to products liability theo-
ries:
There are many parties who conceivably have some rela-
tion with the manufacture and sale of the product, but
their relationship is peripheral and not directly related to
the distributive process. For example, a patent licensor, a
consultant, an independent engineering firm, an inde-
pendent testing laboratory, a law firm or, for that matter,
a transportation company or an independent warehouse,
might have some relation to a product and, although per-
haps related to the general economic system, they are out-
118. Id. at 618.
119. Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 786 P.2d 939, 945 (Ariz. 1990).
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side the manufacturing distributing system contemplated
by the products liability theories. 20
In addition, there were a number of cases involving a patent li-
censee's employee injured by a licensed product or process seeking
to recover damages from the patent licensor. Although the lawsuits
were most often brought because workers compensation laws pre-
clude the employee from a direct suit against the employer, the
employee is still a third party relative to the relationship between
the patent licensee and licensor. Therefore, this category of cases
provides guidance on the question of patent licensor liability.
As a first example, an administrator of the estate of a deceased
employee of the patent licensee brought a wrongful death suit
against the patent licensor in Marker v. Universal Oil Product Co.
1 2
1
The licensor had originally developed and patented a petroleum
refining process and engineered equipment to be used in the pat-
ented process. 122 The patent owner licensed the patented process
to the licensee, furnished plans and specifications for the equip-
ment ("know-how"), and sold a catalyst to be used in the patented123
process. While the licensee's employee was lowered into a vessel
to perform a function during a recharging process, he was asphyxi-
ated by deadly carbon monoxide gas created by the catalyst." The
administrator claimed the vessel was defectively designed by the li-
censor and that the licensor was negligent and failed to warn the
decedent of the danger.125 The district court granted the licensor's
directed verdict against the plaintiff.126 The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed finding that the licensor "did not build or service
the unit nor was there a functional failure in its operation which
could be attributed to (the licensor] as its designer.'' 27 With regard
to the licensor's duty to warn, the court stated because the danger
was equally within the technical knowledge of both the licensee
and the licensor, the licensor had no duty to warn of such a poten-
120. Mech. Rubber & Supply Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 399 N.E.2d 722
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980); see also Harms v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 299 N.E.2d 722, 724
(1980) ("several examples of parties that are related to a product, but not in the
distribution chain and not intended to be defendants in a products liability action.
As examples...a patent licensor...").
121. 250 F.2d 603 (10" Cir. 1957).
122. Id. at 604.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 605.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 604.
127. Id. at 605.
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tial danger.28
As a second example, an administrator of the estate of a de-
ceased employee of the licensee brought negligence and strict li-
ability claims against the licensor and licensee of a steel casting
process in Woodell v Amsted Industries.129 The patent license agree-
ment gave the licensee the right to use the licensor's pressure cast-
ing process to make steel products." The licensee obtained their
own equipment from an unrelated manufacturer. 3' The equip-
ment used in the process caused the employee's death. 13 The jury
trial found both the patent licensor and licensee not liable. 133 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed stating there was substan-
tial evidence to indicate that the licensee had, on its own, signifi-
candy changed the design and method of the casting and as a re-
sult, the jury could not have found the licensor responsible for the
accident. 1
Similarly, other courts have found patent licensors not liable
when sued by licensee's employees. 135 As a result, the case law to
date supports the position that a patent licensor could not be
found liable, even if the licensor substantially participates in provid-
ing the licensor with know-how and equipment to be used in the
patented process. Moreover, the recently published Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability should calm patent licensor's fears.... 136
of liability extending to them.
D. Liability Under Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability
Although the co-authors of the Restatement include trademark
licensors as potential defendants in a products liability suit, patent
licensors are not mentioned. However, since the new Third Re-
statement has dramatically increased its discussion on products li-
ability issues, much of the speculation by past commentators on
patent licensor liability may be properly addressed.
First, the co-authors included definitions of a "product" and
128. Id. at 606.
129. 464 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1972).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. ld. n.3.
135. See generally Littlehale v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791
(S.D.N.Y.1966), affd, 380 F.2d 274 (2nd Cir.1967).
136. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUcTs LABILITY (1998).
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"one who sells or otherwise distributes." These definitions can be
used to analyze the speculation that patents are "products" and
patent licensors are "seller or distributors."
Under Section 19, "Definition of Product," there are two types
of property, intangible property and real property. Patent rights
are not defined in either category. The authors describe only two
basic types of intangible personal property as potential products: 1)
information in media such as books, maps and navigational charts;
and 2) harm-causing products involving the transmission of forces,
such as electricity and X-rays. 37 Real property is included in the
definition. However, it is noted that courts have been reluctant to
impose products liability on sellers of real property. 3 ' The Restate-
ment also references several state statutes enacted in recent years
that define the term "product.''139 Licensed patent rights are not
included in these definitions either. Although the authors of the
Restatement state that "in every instance it is for the court to deter-
mine as a matter of law whether something is, or is not, a prod-
uct,'' 4° based on the analysis of the case law above, licensed patent
rights should not be viewed as a "product."
"One who distributes a product" is defined in Section 20 of the
Restatement as someone who:
provides a product to another either for use or consump-
tion or a preliminary step leading to ultimate use or con-
sumption. Commercial nonsale product distributors in-
clude, but are not limited to, lessors, bailors, and those
who provide products to others as means of promoting ei-
ther the use or consumption of such products or some
other commercial activity.141
While past commentators argued that a patent licensor is simi-142
lar to a lessor in that property is leased to another party for use, a
patent license does not extend anything beyond a promise not to
sue the licensee if he should practice the invention. Moreover,
even if patent rights could be declared a product, the Restatement
requires that it be either "for use or consumption." As mentioned
above, a U.S. patent does not carry with it the right to use, but
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oFToRTs: PRODuCTsLIABILrrY § 19 cmt. d (1998).
138. Id. at§ 19 cmt. e.
139. Id. at § 19 note. a.
140. Id. at § 19 cmt. a.
141. Id. at § 20(b).
142. Dennis R. Kimball, Strict Tort Liability of Inventors for Defective and Dangerous
Inventions: The Issue May Be On the Horizon, 10 CAP. U. L. REV. 803, 816 (1981).
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rather to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, and143
selling the invention throughout the United States. Regardless,
patent licensors are not expressly included in the definition as "one
who distributes a product."
Secondly, the Restatement provides guidance in addressing the
analogy proposed by commentators between the patent licensor
and the trademark licensor. The owner of a trademark is not liable
if he licenses a manufacturer to place the licensor's trademark on
the manufacturer's product and distribute it as though manufac-
tured by the licensor.14 Even though purchasers of the product
might assume that the trademark owner was the manufacturer, the
trademark licensor does not "sell or distribute as its own a product
manufactured by another." Then, by analogy, if a patent licensor
licenses patent rights to a manufacturer and the manufacturer de-
cides to practice those rights, the patent licensor would not be
strictly liable because the licensor does not "sell or distribute as its
own a product manufactured by another."
The Restatement does state that trademark licensors are liable
for harm caused by defective products distributed under the licen-
sor's trademark when they "participate substantially in the design,
manufacture, or distribution of the licensee's products." In support
of this position, the Restatement cites Torres and City of Hartford. But
as mentioned above, Torres included dicta stating that a patent li-
censor is in a different position than that of a trademark licensor.1
45
Moreover, the facts of Torres do not fit that of the typical patent li-
censor/licensee situation, where the licensor is a separate company
from its licensee. The licensor in Torres was the parent company
and its licensees were its subsidiaries. It is also doubtful that any
patent licensor would "participate substantially" as much as the
trademark licensor Goodyear participated by designing, producing,
packaging, advertising, selling and warranting its tire. Similarly, in
City of Hartford, the licensor formulated, designed, advertised,
manufactured, distributed, sold, nationally promoted, and issued
specifications and instructions for the product bearing its trade-
mark.' 4 Thus, based on these differences between a trademark li-
censor and a patent licensor, the patent licensor would not be
143. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1999).
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucTS LIABILITY § 14 (1998).
145. Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 786 P.2d 939, 944 (Ariz. 1990).
146. City of Hartford v. Assoc. Constr. Co., 384 A.2d.390 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1978).
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strictly liable.
Moreover, the policies supporting patent law differ greatly
from the policies supporting trademark law. A trademark licensor
must retain sufficient control over the nature and quality of the li-
censee's finished product to ensure goods bearing the trademark
are of the same nature and quality of the goods bearing the trade-
mark before the licensing. A patent licensor does not have a simi-
lar duty. In fact:
[t]here is nothing in the patent statute or any other stat-
utes... which gives the Patent Office the right or the duty
to require an applicant to prove that [his invention is]
safe, effective and reliable for use with humans. It is not
for [the court] or the Patent Office to legislate, and if the
Congress desires to give this responsibility to the Patent
Office, it should do so by statute.
Therefore, even if the information in the patent is inaccurate,
leading to hazard, or accurate and failing to adequately warn about
hazards, it is nonetheless only information, as opposed to a product
itself. 48 Thus, in licensing a patent, the licensor is not passing on
any guarantee of safety from the Patent Office.
Although it is probably a safe assertion that patent licensors
are not strictly liable for the actions of their licensees, a patent li-
censor might still be liable for negligence. If a patent licensor li-
censes any special knowledge or technical assistance to the manu-
facturer to assist the licensee in making the invention covered by
the patent, he or she may be negligent. This special knowledge or
technical assistance is commonly called "know-how" and may be in
the form of trade secrets, manufacturing techniques, technical as-
sistance, documented procedures, drawings, equipment, operator
guides and manuals, raw material specifications, etc. By providing
know-how or technical assistance, the patent licensor might be seen
as the provider of designs or plans to the licensee and thus, viewed
in the same category as original designers. When assessing their li-
ability risk, patent licensors who are also licensing know-how may
wish to refer to the analysis provided in the designer section above.
Alternatively, patent licensors may consider avoiding licensing any
special knowledge in conjunction with the patent itself.
147. In re Krimmel, 292 F.2d 948, 954 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
148. Phillip M Goldman, Strict Liability and Intellectual Property Licensors-Keeping
Closed a Can of Worms, 66J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'Y630, 643 n.5 (1984).
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E. Other Policy Considerations
Lastly, imposing products liability onto patent licensors dis-
courages innovation and development of technology. Inventors
are given strong exclusive rights, for limited times, to exploit their
innovation commercially. These rights stem from the intellectual
property clause of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress "to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."149 The purpose of a patent
grant is "to provide an incentive for private enterprise to devote re-
sources to innovative research, to make the investment required to
put new inventions into practice, and to make the benefits of the
invention available to a wider public."'15' As a result, when the pat-
ent issues, it is published to the public and allows for the progres-
sion of science by allowing others to build on the advancements of
technology. To complicate this relatively well settled and socially
valuable behavior of innovation and licensing by the sudden impo-
sition of products liability would mean compensating a few at the
expense of disrupting a vital tool of business. This could at the very
least chill, if not smother, licensing transactions, and all the bene-
fits to society. '5' Even if the patent licensor is protected from the
financial burden in the license agreement, the very fact that prod-
ucts liability could be imposed would cast an ominous and unnec-
essary cloud of uncertainty on each license arrangement, and stifle
the innovation that the patent system is meant to encourage.152
VII. METHODS FOR MINIMIZING LIABILITY
The relationships between the parties is the one unifying
theme that seems to dominate when courts decide whether or not
to find trademark licensors, designers who are not the manufac-
turer, and patent licensors liable for the torts of their licensees or
manufacturers. Where the parties act as if they were partners in
business, the courts are likely to treat them accordingly. In con-
trast, where the parties act as independent businesses, each with
their own individual interests, the trademark licensors, designers
149. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
150. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 610 F.2d 1059, 1070
(3d Cir. 1979).
151. Goldman, supra note 148 at 650-651 n.5.
152. Id.
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who are not the manufacturer, and patent licensors are more likely
to be found not liable. Thus, it is recommended while in the proc-
ess of transferring your trademark, design, or patent to another
party, the transaction reflect the simple act of transferring without
more.
For trademark licensors, this is a difficult balance to strike. To
ensure that its trademark rights are not abandoned, a trademark
licensor must maintain sufficient control to ensure the quality of
the goods is consistent with consumers' expectations. Yet, where a
licensor retains control, the trademark licensor may be subject to
liability. Therefore, when structuring the licensing agreement, the
licensor should retain only the absolute minimum control neces-
sary to protect its trademark rights under the Lanham Trademark
Act. For instance, the licensing agreement should state the trade-
mark licensor has no right to interfere with the actual production
of the goods. If the licensee is not in compliance with the mini-
mum product standards, the licensee will be notified. It should be
entirely up to the licensee to bring the product back into compli-
ance or lose the trademark license. This strategy allows the licensor
to protect its trademark rights without "substantially participating"
in the manufacture or design of the product.
To help minimize a trademark licensor's potential liability for
a breach of implied warranty, it is recommended that the licensee's
sales literature expressly limit the licensor's liability for defects. It is
also suggested that as part of the licensing agreement, the licensee
carry liability insurance with protection not only for the licensee,
but also for the licensor. Depending on the risk associated with the
product, the trademark licensor may also seek additional insurance
for itself.
Lastly, the trademark license should include an indemnifica-
tion clause holding the licensor harmless. For example, the follow-
ing indemnification clause is recommended:
Licensee shall protect, defend, indemnify and hold harm-
less the Licensor, its shareholders, directors, officers, and
employees from and against any and all claims, demands,
losses, suits, liabilities or expenses (including court costs
and reasonable attorneys' fees, if any) for property dam-
age, injury or death of persons resulting from or arising
out of the negligence or intentional or unintentional
wrongful acts of Licensee, its subcontractors (and their
employees and agents), or its invitees, during or in con-
nection with the use of Licensee's products.
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In contrast, designers who are not the manufacturer and pat-
ent licensors do not have the same quality control requirements
that trademark licensors have. They can more easily distance
themselves from the manufacturer of the product. In the event of
litigation, a jury will most likely read the agreement for the transfer
of the designs or licensing of patents. Therefore, it is recom-
mended that every opportunity be taken in the agreement to ex-
press the difference between the two entities to help reduce prod-
ucts liability exposure to the designer or patent licensor.
To help distance the designer or patent licensor from the li-
censee, at the beginning of the agreement, recitals or whereas
clauses may be written to reflect that the designer or patent licen-
sor has designs or patents for which it no longer has an on-going
business.
The recitals should then reflect that the manufacturer desires
to buy such designs from the designer, or desires to license certain
patents or desires to buy the right not to be sued for patent in-
fringement by the patent licensor. The recitals should also state
that the manufacturer or patent licensee is solely responsible for
the design, manufacture, marketing and sale of the final product
made under the license. In the warranties, the agreement should
state that the manufacturer or patent licensee possesses such
knowledge and experience in financial, business, technical, and le-
gal matters in making an agreement of this type that it is: 1) capa-
ble of evaluating the merits and risks of entering into the agree-
ment; and 2) able to bear the economic risks of entering in the
agreement and exploiting the rights transferred. The agreement
should also include an indemnification clause holding the designer
or patent licensor harmless in the event of a products liability claim
against the manufacturer, including any manufacturing defects, de-
sign defects and failures to warn. For example, the following in-
demnification clause is recommended for patent licensors:
Licensee agrees to indemnify, defend and hold harmless
the Licensor and its directors, officers, employees, dis-
tributors, representatives and agents from any and all
claims, actions, demands, losses, costs, expenses (includ-
ing but not limited to reasonable attorneys fees and all
other expenses of litigation and the expenses of handling
claims), damages, liabilities and obligations relating to or
arising from the Licensed Product or alleged Licensed
Product or any component or product incorporating the
Licensed Product or alleged Licensed Product, and which
[Vol. 27:1
30
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 28
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss1/28
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND LICENSORS
are brought, asserted, commenced or pursued by any per-
son or entity not a party to this Agreement against the Li-
censor, regardless of actual or alleged negligence or fault
by the Licensor, including but not limited to indemnifi-
able losses relating to: sickness, bodily injury, personal in-
jury, or death of any person, property damage, or business
damage relating to or arising from the Licensed Product
or alleged Licensed Product or any component or prod-
uct incorporating the Licensed Product or alleged Li-
censed Product, including but not limited to any actual or
alleged defect in the Licensed Product or any component
or product incorporating the Licensed Product manufac-
tured, sold or supplied by Licensee, any actual or alleged
failure to warn with regard to Licensed Product or any
component or product incorporating the Licensed Prod-
uct manufactured, sold or supplied by Licensee, or breach
of any express or implied warranty offered by Licensee on
the Licensed Products.
Depending on the risk associated with the final product, the
designer or patent licensor may require the manufacturer to pur-
chase products liability insurance or buy additional products liabil-
ity insurance for itself. For example, the following Insurance
Clause is recommended:
Licensee shall maintain comprehensive general liability
insurance, including products liability and contractual li-
ability coverage, in an amount and for a time period
which shall cover the liability assumed by Licensee under
this Agreement, such amount being at least $ . Li-
censee shall provide Licensor with a certificate of insur-
ance evidencing the existence of such coverages. Licen-
see shall remain responsible for any liability above the
coverage.
It is important to keep in mind that despite the precautions
taken in the agreement, the designer who is not the manufacturer
or the patent licensor may be found liable if they negligently design
the product. Thus, it is important to take precautions to design
safe products. For instance, it is recommended that a designer or
inventor design a product in compliance with the various govern-
ment standards and engineering association standards. Also, the
designer or inventors should pay close attention to the factors listed
in the Restatement for judging the reasonableness of an alternative
design.
Lastly, it is recommended when drafting the patent applica-
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tion, the patentees are careful about what statements are included
regarding the previous versions of the product. Such statements
may serve as notice and recognition of some danger or hazard that
might be used against the patent owner at a later date.
15
1
IV. CONCLUSION
To summarize, trademark licensors are subject to strict liability
only when their licensee's products or services hurt a third party
and when the licensor participates substantially in the design,
manufacture or distribution of the licensee's product or services.
Evidence of substantial participation includes: using only materials
approved by the licensor, using the licensor's formulas and specifi-
cations, giving the licensor the right to approve labeling, market-
ing, packaging, and advertising, and overlap in management be-
tween the licensee and licensor. Original designers are not subject
to strict liability, but do have a duty of care to provide non-
negligent designs. Lastly, patent licensors are most likely not sub-
ject to strict liability based on the policy discussion above and flaws
in commentator's arguments, and also because of a lack of case law
about the issue. However, patent licensors may be liable for negli-
gence if they provide know-how or technical assistance to their li-
censees in addition to the patents.
In conclusion, before transferring a trademark, a product or
process design or patent rights to a third party, the attorney should
understand the current case law, or lack thereof, and the views of
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. Using the tech-
niques above, the attorney should be able to effectively distance his
or her client from any potential products liability issues.
153. MATTHEW BENDER, PRODUCrS LIABILITY §18.08 (1998).
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